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Abstract
We introduce the notion of veriﬁable information into a model of sequential
debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that
self-censorship may hamper the eﬃciency of information aggregation, as experts
withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this case, silence
is telling and undermines the prevailing view over time if this view is incorrect.
As a result, withholding arguments about the correct state of the world is only
a temporary phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world
being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts becomes large.
For small groups, a simple mechanism the principal can use to improve decision-
making is to appoint a devil’s advocate.
Keywords: experts, committees, career concerns, veriﬁable information, infor-
mation aggregation.
JEL: D71, D82.
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suggestions.1 Introduction
According to the well-known Jury Theorem established by Condorcet (1785), groups
are more likely to reach correct decisions than individuals because idiosyncratic errors
of individuals wash out when votes are aggregated. By contrast, in a highly inﬂuential
book Janis (1972) presents case-study evidence on foreign-policy committees to bolster
his case that concurrence-seeking in groups may induce self-censorship in the sense
that arguments contradicting the prevailing opinion are withheld. As a consequence,
wrong decisions may be taken, even if group members have strong objections privately.
He has coined the term “groupthink” for this psychological drive for consensus. In
this paper we present a model of sequential debate among experts that reconciles these
seemingly opposing views on the eﬃciency of information aggregation in groups.
Our framework is based on Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001). Building on the foun-
dational work of Scharfstein and Stein (1990), they propose a model of sequential
debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. Ottaviani and Sørensen
(2001) show that herding phenomena and informational cascades create a bound to the
amount of information that can be aggregated if experts are uninformed about their
own ability.
While Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) consider cheap
talk, we introduce the assumption of veriﬁable information into a model of sequen-
tial debate.1 The assumption of veriﬁable information is particularly plausible with
regard to experts. Experts may be able to present data or hard facts to bolster their
case. Moreover, they may invest in making information hard by providing a detailed
explanation for their views.2 The essence of our model is that, even if information is
veriﬁable, it may be possible for experts to withhold it. This will be in an expert’s
interest if the evidence is detrimental to his reputation.
1Visser and Swank (2007) consider a simultaneous exchange of non-manipulable messages behind
closed doors before experts vote. However, they do not allow for the possibility of experts withholding
information. Moreover, in our framework information can also be veriﬁed by outside observers.
2See Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) for a model in which senders and receivers can invest in
making soft information hard.
2More speciﬁcally, we consider a model populated by a principal who has to choose
between two actions with uncertain outcomes and a number of experts who engage
in a sequential debate about which decision is correct. Experts are privately endowed
with pieces of veriﬁable information about the state of the world. Like in Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2001), they are interested in creating the impression of expertise. This can
be justiﬁed by the observation that a public perception of high competence may enable
an expert to achieve more prestigious positions in the future. A favorable assessment
of his ability may also enable him to earn a higher wage when moving on to another
position.
Our model provides us with three main insights. First, for a large set of parameters we
show that experts practice self-censorship. In order to preserve their reputation, they
may withhold arguments that do not concur with conventional wisdom and present
only evidence in favor of it.
Second, withholding arguments about the correct state of the world is only a temporary
phenomenon in large groups of experts. This is a consequence of the observation that
experts’ silence is telling in our model. Although initially experts will present only
evidence supporting an incorrect view about the state of the world if the prior beliefs
are suﬃciently biased towards this view, the amount of evidence in favor of the incorrect
view will be comparably meager. The scarcity of evidence in favor of conventional
wisdom will induce all players to revise their assessments of the correct state of the
world over time. At some point, these assessments will have shifted so much that
experts will dare to present arguments in favor of the correct state of the world.
Third and consequently, we establish that the probability of the sequential debate of
experts leading to a correct decision of the principal will converge to one if the number
of experts becomes large. This contrasts with the ﬁnding in Ottaviani and Sørensen
(2001) that herding problems pose a limit to the amount of information that can be
aggregated (see their Lemma 1).
It is well-known that in models of cheap talk typically a large number of equilibria
exist. As a consequence, attention is frequently restricted to a particular equilibrium
3like the most informative one, although it may be unclear why this equilibrium may be
chosen. By contrast, all of our results do not depend on which perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium is selected.
Moreover, we derive a range of parameter values under which equilibrium is unique
and entails an eﬃcient aggregation of information. Intuitively, this obtains if the mere
fact that experts possess evidence is conducive to their reputation and thus induces
them to present their arguments. In this case, the accuracy of the information released
by experts is circumstantial for their reputation.
We also study several model variants. We use the special case of a single expert to
illustrate the severity of self-censorship in our model by demonstrating that a single
expert may withhold information that would aﬀect the decision of the principal. By
contrast, in a model where communication is cheap talk, a single expert would sup-
press his private information only in cases where this information would be immaterial
to the principal’s decision. A simple mechanism the principal could use to improve
decision-making is to appoint an advocatus diaboli. More speciﬁcally, we show that
the quality of decision-making can be improved if an expert is only allowed to challenge
the consensus view but not to present evidence in its favor. Finally, we prove that our
ﬁndings about information aggregation in large groups of experts extend to (i) a model
where experts propose their arguments simultaneously and (ii) the case where the state
of the world cannot be observed directly after the principal has made her decision.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review additional papers related
to ours. Section 3 outlines the model. The optimal behavior of experts is derived
in Section 4. We characterize all perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria in Section 5. The
eﬃciency of information aggregation is analyzed in Section 6. We consider extensions
to our model in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
42 Related Literature
We have already mentioned that our model is related to the literature on the aggre-
gation of private information by voting, which goes back to Condorcet (1785).3 More
recent treatments of the subject pursue a game-theoretic approach that takes into ac-
count the fact that it may not be in the agents’ interests to vote in line with their
private information (see Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1997), Wit (1998)).4
Dekel and Piccione (2000) analyze sequential voting in a game-theoretic framework.
They ﬁnd that equilibria of a simultaneous voting game are also equilibria under se-
quential voting. Consequently, they argue that the results found in the literature on
herd behavior and informational cascades do not immediately extend to models of
voting because, in the latter models, voters condition their action on being pivotal.5
Their model has been extended to include the possibility of abstention (see Battaglini
(2005)) and the desire to vote for the winning candidate (see Callander (2007)). Glazer
and Rubinstein (1998) examine diﬀerent mechanisms to elicit private information from
experts who are interested in the outcome of decision-making or wish their own rec-
ommendation be accepted. In contrast with these models, we assume that agents care
about their reputation for being highly competent.
Thus our framework belongs to the literature on experts with career concerns (see Ot-
taviani and Sørensen (2001), Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006), Visser and Swank (2007),
Gersbach and Hahn (2008), and Hahn (2008)). Visser and Swank (2007) show that in
such a model experts may vote for the a priori unconventional decision. In addition,
there are incentives to show a united front. As mentioned before, our paper is also
related to the work of Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001), who examine the optimal order
of speech for a group of experts. In our paper, we introduce veriﬁable information into
a model of experts with career concerns.
3The Condorcet Jury Theorem was generalized to correlated votes by Ladha (1992).
4For a lucid review of the literature on information aggregation and communication in committees
see Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2009).
5For the literature on herd behavior and informational cascades, see Scharfstein and Stein (1990),
Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), and Ali and Kartik (2010). In these models, decision
makers with similar preferences may suppress their private information if the actions of other agents
suggest the opposite action is correct. This precludes eﬃcient information aggregation.
5The assumption of veriﬁable information was introduced into a sender-receiver game by
Milgrom (1981), who determines conditions in terms of the sender’s and the receiver’s
ideal actions that guarantee the existence of separating equilibria. Seidmann and Win-
ter (1997) ﬁnd more general conditions under which all equilibria are separating (see
also Mathis (2008)).6 Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007) compare the amount of infor-
mation conveyed in games of cheap talk to the respective amount in a framework with
veriﬁable information.7 In the present paper, we study a game of veriﬁable information
with an arbitrary number of senders who are not interested in the action chosen by the
principal but in their reputation for being competent.
3 Model
We consider a model inhabited by a principal and N ≥ 1 experts, indexed by i =
1,...,N. Experts engage in a sequential debate about the correct state of the world.
Subsequently, the principal makes a decision, based on the information revealed in the
debate. After the decision has been taken, all players observe the correct state of the
world, and the ability of experts is assessed. In the following, we give a detailed account
of the informational structure and the motivations of players.
Two diﬀerent states of the world are possible, which we label s = −1 and s = 1.
The prior probabilities of the states are πs ∈]0,1[ (π1 + π−1 = 1). There are two
types of experts, highly competent (H) and less competent ones (L). The ability of
an individual expert is unknown both to the expert himself and to all other players.
All players assign the common probability κi to the event of expert i being highly
competent.
A few words are in order regarding our assumption that experts do not have private
information about their own ability. It has been demonstrated in the literature that
6Crawford and Sobel (1982) developed the canonical model of partisan advise, in which conﬂicts
of interest hamper a complete transmission of non-veriﬁable information.
7Wolinsky (2003) proposes a model of veriﬁable messages in which the receiver is uncertain about
the sender’s preferences. Gersbach and Keil (2005) examine the reallocation of budgets and tasks in
a public organization as a means of eliciting veriﬁable information about productivity improvements
from agents.
6this assumption aggravates herding problems compared to the case where experts are
privately informed about their competence.8 This follows from the observation that
experts who have obtained private information about their own ability being high
have strong incentives to choose an action that is in line with their private signal
(see Trueman (1994), Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001), and Hahn (2008)). Despite the
assumption of unobservable own ability, which makes herding problems particularly
severe in our model, we are able to establish the result that information aggregation
always leads to the state of the world being revealed if the number of experts is large.
Each expert i receives an argument Ai ∈ {−1,1} about the state of the world with
probability qH if he is highly competent and qL if he is less so. With probability
1 − qH or 1 − qL respectively, the expert receives no argument (Ai = 0). We assume
1 ≥ qH > qL ≥ 0, i.e. the probability of receiving an argument is higher for a
highly competent expert than for a less competent one. All events of experts receiving
arguments are independent. The argument of a highly competent expert is correct
with probability pH (pH ≥ 1/2). Hence, with probability pH a highly competent
expert who observes an argument receives Ai = s. With probability 1−pH he receives
Ai = −s. For less competent experts, the probability of obtaining a correct argument
is pL (pL ≥ 1/2).9 Conditional on the state of the world, the arguments of all experts
are independent. We assume pL < pH, which implies that arguments are more likely
to be correct for highly competent experts than for less competent ones.
There is a sequential debate among experts, where the order of speech is exoge-
nously given and is assumed to be i = 1,2,...,N, without loss of generality. We
use   a ∈ {−1,0,1}N to denote the complete vector of arguments raised by all experts.
In particular, the argument revealed by expert i is denoted by ai ∈ {−1,0,1}, where
ai = 0 means that expert i announces no argument. Upon observing Ai ∈ {−1,1},
expert i can choose between truthful revelation (ai = Ai) and withholding the informa-
tion (ai = 0). If expert i has not observed an argument (Ai = 0), he faces a singleton
8In Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) the ﬁrst case is considered in their Lemma 1 and the second
one in their Lemma 4.
9According to our assumptions pH ≥ 1/2 and pL ≥ 1/2, all arguments are more likely to be correct
than wrong. If arguments were correct with a probability less than one half, then one would simply
have to relabel correct arguments as incorrect and vice versa.
7choice set (ai ∈ {0}). Thus we assume that experts cannot prove that they possess
no argument. In this sense, we study a game with partially veriﬁable information (see
Lipman and Seppi (1995) and Forges and Koessler (2005)).
Having observed all arguments   a raised in the debate, the principal chooses an action
σ ∈ {−1,1}. This action delivers utility 1 to the principal if it corresponds to the
correct state of the world s. The principal’s utility is 0 otherwise.10 After the principal
has made her decision, the correct state of the world can be observed by all players.
In line with Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001), experts’ utility is equal to the probability
outside observers (the market) assign to the event of the expert being highly competent,
after observing the complete debate   a and the correct state of the world s. This can
be motivated in several ways. For example, highly competent experts may earn higher
wages in the future.11 Moreover, a favorable perception of their competency may enable
experts to reach more prestigious positions. Finally, they may draw direct utility from
being perceived as highly competent.
In the following, we derive all perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game of sequential
debate. In equilibrium, all experts behave optimally in the debate, given the strategies
of the other experts and the way the market forms its assessment of experts’ abilities.
The principal makes an optimal decision, based on the information revealed in the
debate. Moreover, the market forms Bayesian updates of the probabilities of experts
being highly competent.
4 Behavior of Experts
We begin our analysis with a characterization of experts’ behavior in equilibrium.
Because each expert i’s behavior may depend on the choices of experts 1,...,i − 1, we
introduce   a(i) as the (i − 1)-dimensional vector (a1,...,ai−1). This vector represents
the arguments that can be observed by expert i when he makes his decision.
10Note that the values 0 and 1 only represent convenient normalizations. These normalizations do
not aﬀect our results.
11The incentives to signal a high level of ability in order to achieve higher wages in the future were
ﬁrst modeled explicitly by Holmstr¨ om (1999).
8Now consider the optimal behavior of an expert i, for a given   a(i) ∈ {−1,0,1}i−1. If
the expert has observed no argument (Ai = 0), his decision problem is trivial because
his only possible choice is ai = 0. Hence we focus on Ai ∈ {−1,1} in the following.
In order to derive expert i’s optimal behavior, we have to compute the competence
the market assigns to him in all possible contingencies. We use κi(ai,s) to denote the
market’s assessment of expert i’s competence if he has chosen ai ∈ {−1,0,1} and the
correct state of the world is s.12
Next we introduce λi(Ai), which gives the probability of expert i proposing his argu-
ment if he has obtained Ai ∈ {−1,1}. Consequently, if expert i has received argu-
ment Ai, he remains silent with probability 1−λi(Ai).13 It will be convenient to deﬁne
the following variables:
ρH := qHpH (1)
ρL := qLpL (2)
ρi := κiρH + (1 − κi)ρL (3)
 H := qH(1 − pH) (4)
 L := qL(1 − pL) (5)
 i := κi H + (1 − κi) L (6)
We observe that ρH (ρL) gives the probability of a highly competent (less competent)
expert observing an argument and this argument being correct. Similarly, ρi is the
probability of an expert of unknown level of expertise receiving an argument that is
correct. The  ’s denote the respective probabilities for wrong arguments. For example,
 L is the probability that a less competent expert observes an argument but that this
argument is wrong. Some useful properties of the variables deﬁned above are stated in
Appendix A.
12It is important to keep in mind that κi(.,.) also depends on the preceding part of the debate   a(i).
However, to keep notation simple, we do not make this dependence explicit. Moreover, we note that
κi(.,.) is independent of the strategies of the remaining experts j = i + 1,...,N.
13Like κi(.,.), λi(Ai) will in general depend on the arguments raised by experts j = 1,...,i − 1.
However, because we consider the behavior of expert i for a ﬁxed pattern of previous arguments, we
again abstain from making this dependency explicit.
9Now we are in a position to derive expressions for κi(.,.), which pinpoint expert i’s
utility:









1 − ρHλi(1) −  Hλi(−1)
1 − ρiλi(1) −  iλi(−1)
κi (9)
κi(0,−1) =
1 − ρHλi(−1) −  Hλi(1)
1 − ρiλi(−1) −  iλi(1)
κi (10)
These expressions can be explained as follows. Recall that κi(1,1) is the probability
of expert i being highly competent, given that he has proposed argument 1 and that
1 is actually correct. It is given by the ratio of two terms. κiρH corresponds to the
probability of an expert being highly competent and receiving a correct argument. ρi is
the sum of the probability of an expert being highly competent and receiving a correct
argument and the respective probability for a less competent expert. Equation (8) can
be explained in a similar way.
The interpretations of (9) and (10) are somewhat more intricate. κi(0,1) stands for the
probability of expert i being highly competent if he has not announced an argument
and the correct state of the world is 1. It can also be computed as the ratio of two
expressions. First, it depends on (1−ρHλi(1)− Hλi(−1))κi, which is the probability of
expert i being highly competent and announcing no argument. Here we have used the
observation that the probability of a highly competent expert announcing an arbitrary
argument is ρHλi(1)+ Hλi(−1), which is the sum of the probabilities of his announcing
1 and −1. The denominator in (9) is the sum of (1 − ρHλi(1) −  Hλi(−1))κi, which
we have already discussed, and the probability of expert i being less competent and
announcing no argument, which is (1 − ρLλi(1) −  Lλi(−1))(1 − κi). The explanation
for (10) is analogous.
There is a conspicuous diﬀerence between (7) and (8) on the one hand and (9) and
(10) on the other. (7) and (8) do not depend on λi(1) and λi(−1), i.e. the strategy
chosen by expert i in equilibrium. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that
(7) and (8) correspond to the veriﬁable pieces of information Ai = 1 and Ai = −1. By
contrast, for (9) and (10) expert i claims to be of type Ai = 0, which is not veriﬁable.
10We also note that κi(0,Ai) is a decreasing function of λi(Ai) for Ai ∈ {−1,+1}. We
will see that, as a consequence, multiple equilibria may exist. Suppose the market
believes that λi(Ai) = 1 for some Ai. Then it will assign a low level of competence to
expert i when he announces no argument and the state of the world turns out to be
s = Ai. As a result, the expert will ﬁnd it attractive to announce argument Ai. By
contrast, if λi(Ai) = 0, then the market will ascribe a comparably high probability to i
being of type H if s = Ai and the expert has announced no argument. This, in turn,
makes it attractive for expert i to withhold argument Ai.
We introduce π1(  a(i)) and π−1(  a(i)) to denote the updated probability that 1 and
−1 are the correct states of the world, conditional on   a(i), the complete pattern of
arguments raised by experts j = 1,...,i−1. Using Bayes’ formula, it is straightforward
to derive formal expressions for these probabilities. We will take up this point later.
For the sake of brevity, we consider only pure strategies.14 The following lemma, which
is proved in Appendix B, identiﬁes all possible kinds of behavior that may occur in
equilibrium:
Lemma 1
Consider a ﬁxed   a(i) ∈ {−1,0,1}i−1.
1. If the market believes that i always withholds his argument upon observing   a(i),
then it will not be optimal for i to do so.
2. Suppose the market believes that i will withhold his argument for Ai = α and
will present it for Ai = −α, where α is ﬁxed with α ∈ {−1,+1}. Then this




3. Suppose the market believes that expert i will always present his argument. Then










14All major ﬁndings in this paper extend to equilibria in mixed strategies. An analysis is available
upon request.
11We have utilized the following deﬁnitions:
C1 :=




 L(1 − ρH) −  H(1 − ρL)
ρH(1 −  L) − ρL(1 −  H)
< 1 (14)
Lemma 1 has several implications. The ﬁrst part states that the constellation λi(1) =
λi(−1) = 0 can be ruled out. This observation represents an important step towards
our ﬁnding that sequential debate reveals the true state of the world in the long run,
as it guarantees that in each equilibrium there is always a positive probability of each
expert revealing some information.
Another consequence of Lemma 1 is that the sign of C2 is crucial for the characterization
of equilibria. If it is weakly negative, then λi(1) = λi(−1) = 1 is the only possible
behavior of expert i in equilibrium. By contrast, if it is strictly positive, then which
type of behavior may occur in equilibrium depends on
πα(  a(i))
π−α(  a(i)).
It is instructive to examine the factors determining the sign of C2 more closely. Due
to ρH(1 −  L) > ρL(1 −  H) (see (16)), C2 > 0 iﬀ
 L(1 − ρH) >  H(1 − ρL). (15)
In order to give an intuition for (15), we compare two formal expressions. First, we state
the probability of an expert being of type H if he has not received a correct argument,
which implies that he has either received a wrong argument or no argument. This
probability is given by (κi(1−ρH))/(κi(1−ρH)+(1−κi)(1−ρL)). Second, we consider
the probability of an expert being of high competency, given that he has received a
wrong argument. This probability is (κi H))/(κi H +(1−κi) L). It is easy to see that
(15) is equivalent to the statement that the ﬁrst probability is larger than the second.
As a consequence, (15) has the interpretation that the information that an expert has
not observed the correct argument would be more favorable to this expert’s reputation
than the information that the expert has observed the wrong signal. So releasing wrong
signals is particularly harmful to an expert’s reputation, which may induce experts to
withhold information if this information does not conform to the consensus view.
12An alternative interpretation can be given to (15) by noting that it can be rewritten
as qL >  H/((1 − pL)(1 − ρH) + pL H), which is tedious but straightforward to show.
Accordingly, (15) stipulates that qL be suﬃciently large. If qL is lower, less competent
experts will receive an argument with very low probability. Consequently, the mere
fact that an expert has observed an argument suggests a high probability of his being
highly competent, irrespective of the accuracy of his argument. As a result, expert i
will always present his argument in equilibrium if (15) does not hold.
Figure 1: Overview over the pure strategies that may be chosen in equilibrium.
The ﬁndings of Lemma 1 in the case where (15) holds are displayed in Figure 1, where
we adopt the convenient convention to display the conditions stated in the lemma in
log-likelihoods.15 The ﬁgure makes it clear that, for suﬃciently low and suﬃciently high
values of ln(π1(  a(i))/π−1(  a(i))), herding always occurs, as only one type of argument
is presented by expert i, namely the one consistent with the consensus view. Evidence
challenging the consensus view is withheld by the expert because it is probably incorrect
and thus would damage his reputation.
5 Equilibria
In the following we characterize all perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. For this purpose,
we need to give a detailed account of the updating process for probabilities πs(  a(i)),
15Mixed strategies may be proﬁtable for −lnC1 ≤ ln(π1(  a(i))/π−1(  a(i))) ≤ −lnC1 + |lnC2| and
lnC1 − |lnC2| ≤ ln(π1(  a(i))/π−1(  a(i))) ≤ lnC1 respectively.
13which is delegated to Appendix C. There we demonstrate that the updating process
is most conveniently formalized in terms of log-likelihoods ln(πs(  a(i))/π−s(  a(i))). We
show that the release of arguments +1 and −1 always makes the respective states more
likely. Because arguments +1 and −1 correspond to the veriﬁable types, the magni-
tude of these shifts in beliefs is independent of the strategies chosen by the expert
in equilibrium. By contrast, the impact of ai = 0 on ln(πs(  a(i + 1))/π−s(  a(i + 1)))
does depend on expert i’s equilibrium strategy. For example, if the expert makes both
types of argument public in equilibrium, ai = 0 will reveal no information about the
state of the world and hence πs(  a(i+1)) = πs(  a(i)) or ln(πs(  a(i + 1))/π−s(  a(i + 1))) =
ln(πs(  a(i))/π−s(  a(i))) equivalently. If the expert releases only +1 but not −1 in equi-
librium, then ai = 0 will make state −1 appear more probable. This eﬀect has the
intuitive explanation that an expert who does not present an argument may withhold
evidence in favor of s = −1 if λi(−1) = 0 and λi(1) = 1. In this sense, silence is telling
in our model.
The principal’s optimal choice of σ can be speciﬁed in a particularly simple manner:
Lemma 2











The proof of the lemma is obvious. If ln(π1(  a)/π−1(  a)) > 0 holds, then it is more likely
that s = 1 is the correct state of world than s = −1. Consequently, the principal’s
expected utility is maximized by σ = 1. Analogously, ln(π1(  a)/π−1(  a)) < 0 implies
that −1 is more likely to be correct than 1, which induces the principal to opt for
σ = −1.
In line with Lemma 1, a unique equilibrium obtains if (15) fails to hold (and C2 ≤ 0
accordingly). In this equilibrium, all experts present their arguments, irrespective of the
arguments’ types. We summarize this important ﬁnding in the following proposition:
Proposition 1
Suppose (15) does not hold. Then a unique perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists.
All experts i = 1,...,N always choose ai = Ai. The principal behaves according to
Lemma 2.
14This equilibrium describes the case of eﬃcient information aggregation because the
principal obtains all private information from the experts. From our previous discus-
sion, we know that (15) does not hold in situations where an expert who is known to
have received a wrong argument has a higher probability of being highly competent
than an expert who has not observed the correct signal. Therefore, releasing one’s
argument is suﬃciently attractive to experts. For even if this argument turns out to
be wrong, its release will be comparably beneﬁcial to an expert’s reputation.
If (15) does hold, the behavior of expert i will depend on ln(π1(  a(i))/π−1(  a(i))) and
thus on the arguments presented by colleagues j = 1,...,i − 1. Collecting our ﬁndings
about the optimal behavior of experts and the principal as well as the updating proce-
dure concerning beliefs about the correct state of the world (see Appendix C), we can
characterize all perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria if (15) is satisﬁed:
Proposition 2
Suppose (15) holds. Then Lemmas 1 and 2 and Equations (34)-(37) (see Appendix C)
jointly describe all perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria.
6 Information Aggregation
In the previous section we have demonstrated that, if ln(π1(  a(i))/π−1(  a(i))) is suﬃ-
ciently large, expert i will always withhold arguments indicating that the state of the
world is s = −1 in the case where (15) holds. Conversely, if ln(π1(  a(i))/π−1(  a(i))) is
suﬃciently low, expert i will suppress arguments in favor of the view that s = 1.
Hence one might conjecture that, even for a large number of experts, the principal will
never learn the correct state of the world if there is a suﬃciently strong but incorrect
prior belief about the state of the world. This is, however, untrue. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the correct state of the world is −1, but that ln(π1/π−1) is large. Although,
at the beginning of the debate, experts will present only arguments supporting s = 1,
they are not likely to ﬁnd many arguments in line with this view. As a consequence,
experts will remain silent frequently, which will shift the common assessment of the
state of the world towards −1. At some point, ln(π1(  a(i))/π−1(  a(i))) will be suﬃciently
15low such that some expert i will ﬁnd it worthwhile to present an argument supporting
s = −1. Therefore large groups of experts will always enable the principal to make
correct decisions.
To make these arguments more precise, we have to specify a procedure how new mem-
bers are added to an existing group of experts. We start from a particular equilibrium
of the game with N experts and a vector of competencies (κi)N
i=1. Then we introduce
an additional expert N +1 (with a level of competence κN+1 ∈]0,1[). Importantly, the
strategies of experts i = 1,...,N in the equilibrium of the original game correspond
to an equilibrium in the game extended in this way. Thus we can consider the same
strategies of experts i = 1,...,N as before. Finally, possible equilibrium strategies of
expert N + 1 can be identiﬁed by Lemma 1. In Appendix D we show
Proposition 3
If N → ∞, the probability of the principal choosing the correct option converges to 1.
The proposition is a variant of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. For very large groups
of experts, the correct state of the world is perfectly revealed despite the fact that
arguments contradicting the conventional view may be withheld by experts. By con-
trast, for non-veriﬁable information, a similar proposition does not hold. As shown
by Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) in their Lemma 1, experts would always pool for
suﬃciently informative priors and no additional information would be revealed.
The main idea of the proof is that, in each equilibrium, information aggregation can
be described by a stochastic process Xi for the log-likelihoods of the updated beliefs
about the state of the world. One has to show that the probability of this process
suggesting the wrong state of the world converges to zero, as the size of the committee
goes to inﬁnity. The stochastic process fails to have convenient properties such as the
Markov property. The Markov property does not hold because the actions chosen by a
particular member i may not only depend on the probability that a speciﬁc state of the
world is correct, updated for the arguments raised in the debate (with corresponding
log-likelihood Xi−1), but in addition can be a function of the pattern of arguments
16raised by colleagues j with j < i.16 In the course of the proof, we construct another
stochastic process Yi with more convenient properties, which enables us to ﬁnd an
upper bound to the probability of Xi suggesting that the wrong state of the world is
correct. This bound can be shown to converge to zero for large committees, which
establishes the claim of the proposition.
Additionally, we obtain a corollary, which is proved in Appendix H:
Corollary 1
Independent of π1 and π−1, the probability of expert N suppressing correct arguments
converges to zero as N → ∞.
In particular, the corollary holds if experts always withhold information about the
correct state of the world at the beginning of the game because the priors π−1 and
π1 are suﬃciently biased. Therefore herding behavior where experts withhold correct
arguments is always a temporary phenomenon. This distinguishes our model from
standard models of herding in which informational cascades for the incorrect state of
the world continue indeﬁnitely (see Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Banerjee (1992), and
Bikhchandani et al. (1992)).
7 Model Variants
In this section, we consider several variants of our basic model. We demonstrate that
in general ﬁrst-best decision-making cannot be attained, even if there is only a single
expert. A simple mechanism is proposed and shown to improve decision-making: the
appointment of a devil’s advocate. Finally, we prove that our ﬁndings about informa-
tion aggregation in large committees continue to hold (i) if all experts announce their
arguments simultaneously, (ii) if the state of the world cannot be observed directly,
and (iii) if the probability of obtaining arguments is identical for types of high and low
competence.
16This follows from the fact that, for speciﬁed prior probabilities about the states of the world,
diﬀerent behaviors may occur in equilibrium (compare Figure 1). Which behavior occurs may depend
on the pattern of previous arguments.
177.1 Single expert
In their analysis of sequential debate with non-veriﬁable information, Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2001) show in their Lemma 2 that the ﬁrst-best is implemented when the
last expert is the only one to be herding with positive probability. The reason for their
ﬁnding is that the last expert herds exactly in situations where his signal would not
aﬀect the principal’s decision anyway.
Now we examine whether this result extends to our framework of veriﬁable information.
Equivalently, we consider whether a single expert entails the ﬁrst-best, i.e. whether
the decision taken by the principal for N = 1 always corresponds to the decision she
would take if she obtained the expert’s private information. In Appendix I, we show
Proposition 4
Suppose N = 1, (15), and ρ1/ 1 > πα/π−α > max{C1,1/C2} for some α ∈ {−1,1}.
Then it is impossible to reach the ﬁrst-best.
Proposition 4 highlights the severity of herding problems in our model. An expert may
withhold veriﬁable information that contradicts conventional wisdom even if, given this
information, the expert believes that the conventional wisdom is more likely to be wrong
than correct. Notably, the expert keeps information secret precisely in situations where
this information would be valuable to the principal because it would aﬀect her decision.
Conversely, the expert releases information that strengthens an already existing bias.
This information is worthless to the principal because it does not inﬂuence her choice.
In this sense, herding problems are more severe in our model than in Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2001).
7.2 Mechanisms to extract more information
The ﬁnding of the previous subsection raises the question how the principal could im-
prove decision-making. One plausible approach is to delegate the role of the advocatus
diaboli to an expert (see Janis (1972)).17 In the case of a single expert, this means
17An interesting alternative would be to oﬀer rewards to experts who propose arguments, in par-
ticular to those experts who challenge the consensus view.
18that the expert is only allowed to raise the argument that corresponds to the a-priori
less likely view but must not raise evidence in line with conventional wisdom.
Proposition 5
Suppose in addition to N = 1, (15), and ρ1/ 1 > πα/π−α > max{C1,1/C2} for some
α ∈ {−1,1} (i.e. the conditions stated in Proposition 4), C1(ρH − ρL)/( L −  H) >
πα/π−α holds. Then the advocatus-diaboli mechanism ensures the ﬁrst-best.
Hence assigning the role of an advocatus diaboli to an expert can actually improve
decision-making. Intuitively, if the expert must not announce arguments that are in
line with the a-priori more likely view, the only way he can signal his competence is
by challenging this view.18 These arguments are particularly valuable to the principal
because they may aﬀect her decision, whereas arguments that strengthen the prevailing
opinion about the state of the world have no eﬀect on her choice.
7.3 Simultaneous debate
It is an interesting question whether the simultaneous release of arguments guarantees
an optimal decision of the principal if the group of experts is suﬃciently large. We ﬁnd
Proposition 6
Suppose all experts exchange their arguments simultaneously. Then the probability
of the principal choosing the correct option converges to one as the committee size
approaches inﬁnity.
The proof is delegated to Appendix K. The proposition holds even if prior beliefs
about the state of the world are so strongly tilted towards the incorrect state of the
world that all experts withhold evidence in support of the correct state of the world.
Intuitively, information that is in line with the incorrect state of the world is released
18According to (10), κ1(0,−1) =
1−ρHλ1(−1)−µHλ1(1)
1−ρ1λ1(−1)−µ1λ1(1) κ1. As can be veriﬁed easily, this expression
is increasing in λ1(1) if (15) holds. As a consequence, conditional on s = −1, withholding Ai = −1
is less harmful to the expert if λ1(1) = 1 than in the case where λ1(1) = 0. This explains why an
expert is more inclined to raise an argument challenging the consensus view if he must not announce
arguments in line with this view.
19by all experts in this case. However, if only few experts ﬁnd this kind of evidence, the
principal will learn that the consensus view is wrong.
7.4 State of the world unobservable
We have assumed in this paper that the state of the world is perfectly revealed after
the principal has made her decision. This has the convenient implication that each
expert does not have to consider the consequence of his action for the future course of
the debate. If we made the assumption that the state of the world is not revealed by
the principal’s decision, the model would be intractable in general. However, for very
large committees, the strategy proﬁles representing equilibria in our model would also
correspond to equilibria in this model variant. This is a direct consequence of the fact
that these strategy proﬁles reveal the state of the world perfectly, even if a single expert
deviates from his equilibrium strategy. Thus the strategy proﬁles remain individually
optimal. To sum up, for very large committees, there are always equilibria in which the
state of the world is revealed perfectly by the debate among experts. This conclusion
holds for both sequential and simultaneous debate.
7.5 Case with qH = qL
So far, we have assumed qH > qL. This may raise the question how our results would
be aﬀected if we considered qH = qL. This assumption would have the consequence
that an additional behavior of experts is consistent with equilibrium in the knife-edge
case where π1(  a(i)) = π−1(  a(i)) = 1/2. In addition to the constellations described
in the second and third part of Lemma 1, it is possible that an expert i presents no
argument (to see this, examine the analysis of λi(1) = λi(−1) = 0 in Appendix B and
note that qH = qL entails ( L −  H)/(ρH − ρL) = 1). Our ﬁndings about information
aggregation in large committees would continue to hold if (i) we excluded the possi-
bility that the priors about the two diﬀerent realizations of the state of the world are
perfectly balanced or (ii) we introduced the tie-breaking rule that experts announce
their arguments when indiﬀerent between withholding and announcing them.
208 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a model of sequential debate among experts who have
private veriﬁable information about the state of world and are motivated by career
concerns. We have demonstrated that self-censorship may hamper the aggregation of
information and may lead to wrong decisions by small groups, even if experts have
objections privately. These ﬁndings are in line with the pessimistic view of group
decision-making held by Janis (1972).
An expert may withhold evidence that conﬂicts with conventional wisdom, even if,
based on this information, he believes the prevailing opinion to be wrong and even if
the evidence would induce the principal to revise her decision. In this case, decision-
making can be improved by assigning the role of a devil’s advocate to an expert.
Despite the problems created by self-censorship, there is no upper bound to the amount
of information that can be aggregated in the debate if the group of experts becomes
large. Intuitively, it may be the case that experts present only evidence in line with
common wisdom initially. However, if common wisdom is wrong, only few experts will
be able to provide evidence in its support. As more and more experts remain silent,
players revise their beliefs about the state of the world. In this sense, experts’ silence
is telling and will encourage other experts to challenge the prevailing view after some
time. In the end, this will lead to a correct assessment of the state of world, which lends
support to the Condorcetian perspective that decision-making guarantees an optimal
decision for large groups.
21A Useful Properties
Our assumptions qH > qL and pH > pL ≥ 1/2 and deﬁnitions (1)-(6) immediately
imply ρH > ρL, ρH + H > ρL+ L, ρH >  H, ρL ≥  L, ρi >  i. In addition, we obtain
ρH(1 −  L) > ρL(1 −  H). (16)
This claim can be veriﬁed by applying deﬁnitions (1), (2), (4), and (5), which yields
qHpH(1−qL(1−pL)) > qLpL(1−qH(1−pH)) or equivalently qHpH(1−qL) > qLpL(1−qH).
The latter inequality results from qL < qH and pL < pH. (16) has the intuitive
interpretation that the probability of an expert being highly competent is higher if he
has observed a correct argument than in the case where he has not observed the wrong
argument.19 
B Proof of Lemma 1
Derivation of a condition guaranteeing that it is proﬁtable for i to announce Ai
Suppose expert i has observed Ai ∈ {−1,1}. Then the probability of Ai corresponding
to the correct state of the world is (πAi(  a(i))ρi)/(πAi(  a(i))ρi + π−Ai(  a(i)) i), which
takes into account the facts that the probability of i observing a correct argument is ρi
and that the probability of his observing a wrong argument is  i. In addition, we have
applied our assumption that the event of i observing a correct argument is independent
of whether other experts observe a correct or incorrect argument (or no argument at
all). In a similar vein, expert i estimates the probability of −Ai being the correct state
of the world to be (π−Ai(  a(i)) i)/(πAi(  a(i))ρi + π−Ai(  a(i)) i).
After these preparations we can state a condition guaranteeing that it is advantageous
19Notice that the probability of an expert being highly competent, conditional on his having ob-
served the correct argument, is (κiρH)/(κiρH + (1 − κi)ρL). Given that an expert has not observed
a wrong argument, his probability of being of type H amounts to (κi(1 −  H)))/(κi(1 −  H) + (1 −
κi)(1 −  L)). Comparing both expressions yields (16).
22for expert i to announce his argument Ai:
πAi(  a(i))ρi
πAi(  a(i))ρi + π−Ai(  a(i)) i
κi(Ai,Ai) +
π−Ai(  a(i)) i




πAi(  a(i))ρi + π−Ai(  a(i)) i
κi(0,Ai) +
π−Ai(  a(i)) i
πAi(  a(i))ρi + π−Ai(  a(i)) i
κi(0,−Ai)
(17)
If the condition is violated, it is proﬁtable for i to withhold Ai. With the help of






1 − ρHλi(Ai) −  Hλi(−Ai)
1 − ρiλi(Ai) −  iλi(−Ai)

≥π−Ai(  a(i)) i

1 − ρHλi(−Ai) −  Hλi(Ai)







In the following, we evaluate this condition for the three cases mentioned in the lemma.
Analysis of λi(−1) = 0 and λi(1) = 0















where we have used λi(−1) = 0 and λi(1) = 0. Condition (19) can be rewritten as
πAi(  a(i))(ρH − ρi) ≤ π−Ai(  a(i))( i −  H). (20)
Because ρH − ρi = ρH − κiρH − (1 − κi)ρL = (1 − κi)(ρH − ρL) and  i −  H =




 L −  H
ρH − ρL
. (21)
We note that the right-hand side of this inequality is strictly lower than 1, which is a
consequence of  L −  H < ρH − ρL, which follows from ρH +  H = qH, ρL +  L = qL,
and qH > qL.
Finally, we have to take into account that (21) has to hold for both Ai = 1 and
Ai = −1. Hence both
π1(  a(i))
π−1(  a(i)) ≤
 L− H
ρH−ρL < 1 and
π−1(  a(i))
π1(  a(i)) ≤
 L− H
ρH−ρL < 1 must hold,
which establishes a contradiction. To sum up, no equilibrium exists in which expert i
never proposes his argument.
23Analysis of λi(α) = 0 and λi(−α) = 1 for α ∈ {−1,+1}
We consider the case with α = 1 where expert i always announces his argument if it
amounts to Ai = −1 and where he remains silent for Ai = 1. Obviously, the analysis
of the other case is completely analogous. The expert’s behavior must be optimal both
for Ai = 1 and Ai = −1. We consider the case Ai = −1 ﬁrst. Utilizing λi(1) = 0 and









≥ π1(  a(i)) i

1 −  H










≥ π1(  a(i))
 i −  H
1 −  i
.
Applying ρH − ρi = ρH − κiρH − (1 − κi)ρL = (1 − κi)(ρH − ρL) and  i −  H =








1 −  i
=






If (22) holds, then it is optimal for i to present argument Ai = −1.
As a next step, we identify the circumstances under which it is optimal for i to withhold






1 −  H
1 −  i










which can be re-arranged as follows:
π1(  a(i))

ρH(1 −  i) − ρi(1 −  H)
1 −  i

≤ π−1(  a(i))





With the help of (3) and (6), we obtain
π1(  a(i))

ρH(1 − κi H − (1 − κi) L) − (κiρH + (1 − κi)ρL)(1 −  H)








which can be simpliﬁed to
π1(  a(i))
ρH(1 −  L) − ρL(1 −  H)
1 −  i
≤ π−1(  a(i))
 L(1 − ρH) −  H(1 − ρL)
1 − ρi
. (23)




 L(1 − ρH) −  H(1 − ρL)
ρH(1 −  L) − ρL(1 −  H)
 
1 −  i
1 − ρi
= C1C2. (24)
Finally, we show that (24) implies (22). For this purpose, we note that (24) implies











ρH(1 −  L) − ρL(1 −  H)
 L(1 − ρH) −  H(1 − ρL)
> 1
and
 L −  H
ρH − ρL
< 1,
which establishes that (22) follows from (25) and thus from (24).
Analysis of λi(1) = λi(−1) = 1


















which, in turn, is readily shown to be equivalent to
πAi(  a(i))(ρH(1 − ρi −  i) − ρi(1 − qH)) ≥ π−Ai(  a(i))( i(1 − qH) −  H(1 − ρi −  i)).
(26)
As a next step, we show
ρH(1 − ρi −  i) − ρi(1 − qH)
=ρH(1 − ρi −  i) − ρi(1 − ρH −  H)
=ρH(1 −  i) − ρi(1 −  H)
=ρH(1 − κi H − (1 − κi) L) − (κiρH + (1 − κi)ρL)(1 −  H)
=(1 − κi)(ρH(1 −  L) − ρL(1 −  H)),
(27)
where we have applied qH = ρH +  H. Similarly, it is straightforward to check
 i(1 − qH) −  H(1 − ρi −  i) = (1 − κi)( L(1 − ρH) −  H(1 − ρL)). (28)




 L(1 − ρH) −  H(1 − ρL)
ρH(1 −  L) − ρL(1 −  H)
= C2. (29)
This condition has to be satisﬁed for Ai = 1 and Ai = −1. Hence the proposed behavior
is optimal if (12) holds. 
C Beliefs about the State of the World
In this Appendix, we describe the updating process for probabilities πs(  a(i)). Triv-
ially, we obtain πs(  a(1)) = πs because   a(1) is empty. As a next step, we consider
πs(  a(2)) = πs(a1), which is the probability of the state of the world being s, condi-
tional on expert 1’s choice a1 =   a(2). Recall that the prior probability of A1 being
correct is πA1. Then the posterior probability of s ∈ {−1,1} corresponding to the
correct state of the world is
πs(a1) =
πs Pr(a1|s)
πs Pr(a1|s) + (1 − πs)Pr(a1| − s)
, (30)
where Pr(a1|s) is the probability of expert 1 choosing a1 conditional on s being the




























This representation has the advantage that Bayesian updating is additive.
As a next step, we compute a formula for beliefs about s, updated for a vector   a(i+1),
which contains the ﬁrst i statements of a general sequence of arguments  a ∈ {−1,0,1}N.
Then, analogously to (32), the updated beliefs satisfy the following recursive formula
for i = 1,...,N:
ln

πs(  a(i + 1))










Pr(ai| − s,  a(i))

, (33)
26where Pr(ai|s,  a(i)) stands for the probability of expert i choosing ai, conditional on s
being the correct state of the world and conditional on   a(i). Recursive iterations yield
ln

πs(  a(i + 1))













Pr(aj| − s,  a(j))

. (34)
It remains to specify Pr(ai|s,  a(i)) for an arbitrary expert i = 1,...,N. We note
that Pr(s|s,  a(i)) = λi(s)ρi, Pr(s| − s,  a(i)) = λi(s) i, Pr(0|s,  a(i)) = 1 − λi(s)ρi −






will depend on   a(i) in general.





























< 0 for ai = −1, (36)
where we have utilized  i < ρi (see Appendix A). Hence if expert i presents his
argument Ai ∈ {−1,1}, this will shift others’ beliefs towards the view that s = Ai is
correct. This statement holds independently of whether the expert behaves according
to the second or third part of Lemma 1 and thus in every equilibrium.








1 − ρiλi(s) −  iλi(−s)








depends on λi(1) and λi(−1), in contrast to the respective
expressions for ai = 1 or ai = −1 (see (35) and (36)). It is instructive to examine this
relationship in more detail.
Suppose λi(−1) = 0, λi(1) = 1, and ai = 0. With the help of (37), it is easily veriﬁed










< 0 (note that ρi >  i). This has the
important implication that, if expert i presents no argument, this will induce an outside
observer to attach a higher probability to the state of the world being −1 than before.
27Finally, we consider λi(1) = λ(−1) = 1, in addition to ai = 0. In this case, expert i
would make both arguments public. As a result, silence (ai = 0) is completely unin-







D Proof of Proposition 3
The proposition is obvious if (15) does not hold, which entails Proposition 1. Thus we
assume (15) is satisﬁed. Without loss of generality, suppose the state of world is −1.
We introduce A as the set of all possible combinations of arguments that N experts
may obtain, i.e. A := {−1,0,1}N. We use   A ∈ A to denote a particular combination
of arguments that experts may obtain (recall that Ai may diﬀer from the argument ai
announced by expert i because the expert may withhold information). Let F be the
full power set of A. Then (A,F) is a measurable space and our assumptions about
the arrival of arguments, conditional on the state of the world being −1, deﬁne a
probability measure P on F.
Moreover, we introduce the ﬁltration (Fi)i=0,...,N, where Fi is the σ-algebra describing
all information about A1,...,Ai for i = 0,...,N. Now each equilibrium of our game of
sequential exchange of arguments represents a mapping from observed arguments   A to
announced arguments  a, i.e. from the set A into A. As a consequence, each equilibrium











to denote this stochastic process. Thus the claim of the
proposition amounts to showing P(XN ≥ 0) → 0 for N → ∞ because it can be optimal
for the principal to choose 1 only if XN ≥ 0, according to Lemma 2.
The following lemma, which will be proved in Appendix E, will be useful:
Lemma 3
The stochastic process Xi has bounded innovations, i.e. a positive constant K exists
such that |Xi − E[Xi|Fi−1]| < K holds for all   A ∈ A and for all i > 0. In addition, a
strictly positive constant k exists with E[Xi+1|Fi] < −k + Xi for all i > 0.
28Now we deﬁne a stochastic process recursively by
Y0 := X0
Yi := Yi−1 + Xi − E[Xi|Fi−1] for i > 0
We note that Yi is an Fi-adapted martingale. Lemma 3 implies that Yi has bounded
increments, i.e. |Yi − Yi−1| < K holds for all   A ∈ A and for all i > 1. Inserting
recursively yields




Now the second part of Lemma 3 implies
Yi ≥ Xi + ki.
Hence P(Xi ≥ 0) ≤ P(Yi − ki ≥ 0) = P(Yi ≥ ki). Consequently, by computing
P(Yi ≥ ki), we can establish an upper bound to P(Xi ≥ 0).
Finally, we apply the Azuma-Hoeﬀding inequality, which goes back to Hoeﬀding (1963)
and Azuma (1967), and is presented in McDiarmid (1989) (see the proof of Lemma 4.1
on p. 160):
Lemma 4
(Azuma-Hoeﬀding inequality) Suppose {Yi}
N
i=0 is a martingale with |Yi −Yi−1| ≤ ci for
each i, for suitable constants ci. Then for any χ > 0











If we set χ = kn−Y0, which is positive for suﬃciently high values of n, and recall that
|Yi − Yi−1| < K holds for all i > 1, we obtain that (38) implies







If we increase the number of experts, the right-hand side of (39) converges to zero.
Thus P(YN ≥ kN) converges to zero, which in turn implies P(XN ≥ 0) → 0 as
P(XN ≥ 0) ≤ P(YN ≥ kN). 
29Ai = 1 Ai = −1 Ai = 0 Exp. with respect to Fi−1

































































Table 1: Xi − Xi−1 for the diﬀerent possible behaviors described in Lemma 1 (rows)
and diﬀerent realizations of Ai (columns). The last column speciﬁes E[Xi|Fi−1]−Xi−1.
E Proof of Lemma 3











. In Table 1, we summarize the diﬀerent values for Xi − Xi−1 that
may occur. The values can be veriﬁed by using (35)-(37). The last column gives
E[Xi|Fi−1]−Xi−1 for the three diﬀerent possible behaviors speciﬁed in Lemma 1, where
we utilize that, conditional on the state of the world being s = −1, Ai = 1 occurs with
probability  i, Ai = −1 with probability ρi, and Ai = 0 with probability 1 − ρi −  i.
































|Xi − Xi−1| < K.
As a next step, we show a constant k > 0 exists such that E[Xi|Fi−1]−Xi−1 < −k for
each row in table 1. For this purpose, we show in Appendix G that the derivatives of all
entries in the last column of Table 1 with respect to κi are strictly negative ∀κi ∈]0,1[.
Hence these entries are always strictly larger if they are evaluated at κi = 0, which
entails ρi = ρL and  i =  L, than for arbitrary κi ∈]0,1[. As a consequence, we obtain
for the ﬁrst entry in the last column of Table 1:











where we have used ρL >  L.






+ (1 − ρi)ln
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+ (1 − ρL)
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with respect to κi and the fact that lnx < x − 1
∀x  = 1.






− (1 −  i)ln









− (1 −  L)ln
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+ (1 −  L)ln
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1 − ρL








+ (1 −  L)

1 − ρL




Note that we have again used lnx < x−1 ∀x  = 1. Hence all entries in the last column
of Table 1 are strictly smaller than a negative constant that does not depend on κi.
This establishes the claim of the lemma. 



































 H. Inserting (3),
this can be re-arranged as (κiρH + (1 − κi)ρL) H < (κi H + (1 − κi) L)ρH, which
is equivalent to ρH L > ρL H. Using (1), (2), (4), and (5), this can be rewritten as
qHpHqL(1 − pL) > qLpLqH(1 − pH), which follows from pH > pL.










∀κi ∈]0,1[. For this purpose we proceed
as follows. We ﬁrst demonstrate that the left-hand side of the inequality is strictly










, as limκi→1 i =  H





































 H −  L







1 −  i
 

(ρH − ρL)  
1 −  i
1 − ρi





1 −  i
  ((ρH − ρL) − ( H −  L)) (43)
=
1
1 −  i
  (qH(2pH − 1) − qL(2pL − 1)) > 0, (44)
where we have used
dρi
dκi = ρH − ρL (see (3)),
d i
dκi =  H −  L (see (6)), (1)-(3), (4), (6),






























1−pH (see (1) and (4)). Rearranging yields
(1 − qH(1 − pH))(1 − pH) < pH(1 − qHpH). Collecting terms, we obtain qH(p2
H − (1 −
pH)2) < 2pH − 1 and thus qH(2pH − 1) < 2pH − 1, which holds due to pH > 1/2 and
qH < 1. 
G Proof that the Derivatives of All Entries in the
Last Column of Table 1 with Respect to κi are
Negative




 H −  L
 i
=





[κi HρH + (1 − κi) LρH − κi HρL




[ρH L − ρL H] > 0,
(45)
where the expression is strictly positive because ρH L > ρL H, which is readily veriﬁed
by using (1), (2), (4), and (5). In addition, recall that, according to (3) and (6),
32ρi = κiρH + (1 − κi)ρL and  i = κi H + (1 − κi) L. This implies
dρi
dκi = ρH − ρL and
d i
dκi =  H −  L.
After these preparations, we are in a position to compute the sign of the derivatives
















= − (ρH − ρL −  H +  L)ln
ρi
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 H −  L
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
= − (qH(2pH − 1) − qL(2pL − 1))ln
ρi
 i





 H −  L
 i

This expression is negative because qH > qL, pH > pL, ρi >  i, and (45).
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 i(1 −  i)
= −
ρi −  i









where we have applied
dρi
dκi = ρH − ρL,
d i
dκi =  H −  L, and lnx < x − 1 ∀x  = 1. This
expression is negative because the term in brackets is positive, which is in line with
(45).
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.
If  H ≤  L, this expression is strictly negative (recall ρi >  i). In the following, we
therefore consider  H >  L. Because lnx < x − 1 ∀x  = 1, we obtain
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< 0 also for  H >  L. 
H Proof of Corollary 1
The claim is trivial if (15) does not hold, which implies a revelation of all arguments,
according to Proposition 1. Consequently, we assume (15) in the following. Suppose,
without loss of generality, that s = −1.
Lemma 1 yields that expert N always presents Ai = −1 if the prevailing view
is that −1 is suﬃciently more likely to be correct or, more precisely, if XN−1 <
min{−|lnC2|,|lnC2|−|lnC1|}. Hence expert N presents Ai = −1 with probability one
if N is suﬃciently large because limN→∞P (XN−1 < min{−|lnC2|,|lnC2| − lnC1}) =
1, which follows from the proof of Proposition 3. 
34I Proof of Proposition 4
In order to demonstrate that it is possible to satisfy the conditions given in the propo-
sition, we specify a respective parameter constellation. Suppose N = 1, pH = 1,
qH = 1/2, pL = 1/2, qL = 1/3, κ1 = 3/4, π+1 = 7/9, and π−1 = 2/9. Then
ρH = 1/2,  H = 0, ρL = 1/6,  L = 1/6, ρ1 = 5/12, and  1 = 1/24. This implies
C1 =
1− 1
1−ρ1 = 23/14, C2 =
 L(1−ρH)− H(1−ρL)
ρH(1− L)−ρL(1− H) = 1/3, and
π+1
π−1 = 7/2. For α = 1, it can
be immediately veriﬁed that all conditions stated in the proposition are fulﬁlled.
As a next step, we derive the equilibria if the conditions given in the proposition hold,





π+1 ≤ C1C2, and min{π+1/π−1,π−1/π+1} < C2. In line
with Lemma 1, there is a unique equilibrium in which a1 = 1 for A1 = 1 and a1 = 0
for A1 = −1.











In line with Lemma 2, the principal will choose σ = 1. However, suppose now that
















< 0 (see (36)), which would lead to the decision σ = −1 (compare Lemma 2).
Hence the expert withholds valuable information from the principal and the ﬁrst-best
is not achieved. 
J Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose α = 1, without loss of generality. We note that the conditions mentioned in the
Proposition can be fulﬁlled for the set of parameter values introduced in Appendix I,
for example.
According to Appendix I, there is a unique equilibrium in our basic model with λ1(1) =
1 and λ1(−1) = 0. However, the ﬁrst-best would require that expert 1 announces
A1 = −1. Because πα/π−α > C1 > 1 for α = 1, α = 1 corresponds to the a-priori more






= −C1 corresponds to (37), evaluated at λ1(1) = 1 and λ1(−1) = 0.





 L −  H
  C1,
which holds by assumption. Thus the mechanism ensures an optimal decision. 
K Proof of Proposition 6
If (15) does not hold, a unique equilibrium exists, in which all arguments received by
the experts are released. In this case it is obvious that the correct option is chosen
with certainty for large committees.
Consequently, we assume in the following that (15) does hold. The behavior of experts
can be described by Lemma 1 if we replace πs(  a(i)) by πs. Suppose s = −1 and that
the principal observed the arguments raised by the experts sequentially. Then it is






that describes all information
about the state of the world that is contained in the arguments presented by experts
1,...,i. For this stochastic process P(X′
i ≥ 0) → 0 as N → ∞ because the proof in
Appendix D can be applied to X′
i. 
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